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Contrary to the assumptions of those who pair Dewey and Piaget based on progres-
sivism’s recent history, Dewey shared broader concerns with Vygotsky (whose work 
he never read). Both Dewey and Vygotsky emphasized the role of cultural forms 
and meanings in perpetuating higher forms of human thought, whereas Piaget 
focused on the role played by logical and mathematical reasoning. On the other 
hand, with Piaget, Dewey emphasized the nurture of independent reasoning cen-
tral to the liberal Protestant heritage the two men shared. Indeed, Dewey’s broad 
theorizing of democracy’s implications for schooling can be seen to integrate the 
research emphases of the two psychologists.
Introduction1
It has become a fashion among some to oppose progressive educational theory, asso-
ciated with the scholarship of Dewey and Piaget, with a concern for the pedagogical 
perpetuation of cultural forms and understandings, currently emphasized by those 
working within the Vygotskian tradition. Kieran Egan’s (2002) recent critique of 
progressivism may provide the boldest iteration of such reasoning, yet related argu-
ments can be found elsewhere (see, e.g., Kozulin, 1998). In other academic quarters, 
scholars debate what of Dewey might be claimed as support for a sociocultural tradi-
tion that proceeds primarily in Vygotsky’s name (see, e.g., Glassman, 2001, pp. 3-14; 
2002, pp. 16-20; O’Brien, 2002, pp. 16-20; Prawat, 2002, pp. 16-20).
These contrasting debates are by no means arcane or irrelevant to lan-
guishing issues of school reform. Cogent analysis of the intersections between 
the scholarship of Dewey, Vygotsky, and Piaget promises to inform a set of is-
sues that lies at the very heart of democratic learning and curriculum theory. In 
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particular, Dewey, a philosopher attuned to the contributions of psychology, can 
help educators in their ongoing struggles to theorize the practical implications 
of Vygotsky and Piaget for democratic classrooms. 
Though often misinterpreted in this regard, Dewey’s work deftly negotiates 
a defining democratic tension between the need to perpetuate established cul-
tural forms and understandings, on the one hand, and the need to foster diverse 
and novel ideas and perspectives, on the other. As I discuss below, this tension 
underpins Dewey’s central insights about how to build a democratic nation from 
diverse peoples. For Dewey held that the children of democracies must be ap-
prenticed into collaborative meaning-making processes; they must be allowed to 
appropriate and reinvent, in terms that they can understand, the practical meth-
ods and processes currently in use within their wider society. Rote recapitulation 
of established material, then, could not even ensure students’ adequate mastery 
of essential cultural content and forms.
Piaget, in seeking to track the development of children’s thought, created 
a dynamic method capable of uncovering the evolving logics of a child’s reason-
ing (Mayer, 2005, pp. 362-382). Naturally, Piagetian findings regarding the distinc-
tive perceptions and assumptions of children were widely seen as supporting 
established progressive arguments regarding the need for educators to attend 
to diverse perspectives. Impressed by Piaget’s project, Vygotsky responded with 
investigations into the ways in which existing cultural tools and understandings 
also necessarily challenge and structure children’s nascent thought (Vygotsky, 
1986, pp. 12-57). Dewey, intent on explicating democracy’s implications for school-
ing, sought to synthesize most of the underlying philosophical and psychological 
concerns that shaped both lines of research.
Of the two psychologists, however, it was Vygotsky who grappled with 
the questions about the perpetuation and advancement of cultural forms that 
Dewey found central. Dewey and Vygotsky both sought to root a notion of cul-
tural progress within the concrete realities of shared human purposes and social 
means: human meanings would deepen in a useful and rewarding manner as a 
function of profound cultural appropriation and renewal. Although the two men 
emphasized different aspects of this project, their shared attention to the role 
culture must play in advancing human understanding suggests the deep theo-
retical intersections that underlay their work. 
These intersections are clearly evidenced in the attention that both theo-
rists paid to the nature of learning and of education. Both Dewey and Vygotsky 
focused on the role of cultural activity in the elevation of human thought and 
looked to schools to engender an authentic appreciation of the methods and 
tools that they saw as integral to the work of building their changing nations—
an increasingly diverse and industrial America and a postrevolutionary Soviet 
Union, respectively. Although Piaget did study the role that social interactions 
play in destabilizing narrow and naive reasoning, his research never focused on 
the influences of cultural forms per se.2
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Despite this significant distinction between Piaget’s project and the work 
of Dewey and Vygotsky, one must bear in mind the profound assumptions the 
three men shared. Although all three worked within different cultural milieus, 
each scholar questioned how children might be taught to think in new ways and 
so move beyond lockstep reenactment of the known. Each felt that the neces-
sary quality of intellectual engagement could only be nurtured by giving chil-
dren developmentally appropriate opportunities to make sense of their worlds 
in conversation with others. 
As I have noted elsewhere, Dewey and Piaget were both raised as liberal 
Protestants: each emphasized the nurture of independent reasoning central to 
that heritage (Mayer 2006; see also Vidal 1987). As discussed here, Dewey and Vy-
gotsky both pointed toward established cultural forms as the scaffolding upon 
which human reasoning must climb. Most fundamentally, however, all three 
theorists looked to the increased vitality and capacity of human intelligence as 
the only potential source of the social progress they all desired. 
Similarities between Dewey and Vygotsky
Research on the psychological development of individuals has been interwoven with 
concerns over humanity’s prospects since psychology first organized itself into a 
discipline in Darwin’s tumultuous wake (Plotkin 2004; Richards 1987). Although 
this may seem a wide net to cast here, the careers of both Dewey and Vygotsky 
must be seen in relation to this early disciplinary interest in the links between in-
dividual development and social progress. Both scholars’ attention to educational 
method derived from a conviction that the proper nurture of children’s intellects 
would help to build the enlightened social and political orders that each believed 
his nation promised. Each therefore sought to theorize a new kind of teaching that 
could elevate the quality of thought of all, elevating the character of all cultural 
expression in turn. 
These shared assumptions and purposes resulted from multiple mingled 
strains of influence, none more significant than that of Hegel. Well beyond the 
Darwinian backdrop, Dewey and Vygotsky shared enduring aspects of the Hege-
lian worldview. Whereas Piaget bound a faith in humanity’s forward momentum 
to the species’ evolved capacity for logic and math (Chapman, 1986, pp. 181-194), 
Dewey and Vygotsky bound their faith in a given society’s capacity for historical 
advancement to the efficacy and sensitivity of that society’s cultural resources. 
For both Dewey and Vygotsky, cultural advancement represented a more diffuse 
and complex affair and drew upon meanings of every kind. 
Kozulin (1990) has identified three key aspects of Hegel’s influence on Vy-
gotsky, all of which, I will argue, were shared by Dewey. First, though, it may be 
useful to remark on the divergent political traditions through which each scholar 
found his way to Hegel, as these traditions—Marxism and liberal democracy—are 
opposed in some regards and yet align in the ways that matter here. 
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Dewey rejected Marxism’s faith in historically determined processes and in 
the revolutionary potential of violent class struggle.3 As a young scholar, Dewey 
had shed his own fond attachments to absolutist storylines and had grown averse 
to their implications for social and political theory. 4 Dewey’s radically democratic 
vision was rooted in the belief that any nation set on greater social equality must 
enlighten both capitalist and worker. 
For Vygotsky, in contrast, the toppling of despotism in the name of human-
ity’s greater equality and fraternity had been ushered in by the political insights of 
Marx. The banner of Marx provided Vygotsky with a bright (albeit brief) moment 
of political possibility and with what Vygotsky may well have viewed as historical 
pretext for his grand overthrow of psychological reductionism. For the majority 
of the limited years in which Vygotsky worked as a research psychologist, the 
revolution had appeared to have arrived (Bruner, 1997, pp. 63-73). 
Vygotsky’s thinking, however, drew deeply on Western psychological and 
philosophical traditions: fanatic and antihistoric party lines no more suited Vy-
gotsky’s nuanced sensibility than Dewey’s. Indeed, Vygotsky was raised within a 
Jewish tradition of textual interpretation5 and later studied linguistics and literary 
theory amidst Russia’s cataclysmic transition from royal rule to socialist state. While 
such an upbringing may have fostered a more tolerant attitude toward Marxist 
doctrine, Vygotsky’s intellectual background did not lend itself to simple social 
prescription or to radical ideological impositions of any kind. Societies may be 
reborn, but only in relationship to cultural meanings that derive their value from 
historically rooted texts and traditions. 
From within their disparate cultural contexts, then, both Dewey and Vy-
gotsky studied their Hegel. Along with many others, both scholars found their 
hopes for an historical progression articulated there; in the company of a consid-
erably fewer number, both then turned to the work of grounding those hopes in 
the material conditions of humanity. In Vygotsky’s case, he naturally traced this 
effort to Marx. In Dewey’s case, this effort was supported through his close per-
sonal and professional association with George Herbert Mead. 
Unlike Dewey, Mead had spent several postgraduate years in Germany, study-
ing with the famed psychologist Wilhelm Wundt. Germany was not only the intel-
lectual epicenter of experimental psychology at the time, but also of post-Hegelian 
thought; and Mead became interested in the social theory of one of Marx’s con-
temporaries, Ferdinand Lassalle.6 Mead was to extend Wundt’s attention to the 
communicative implications of gesture into a social theory of consciousness that 
served Dewey’s purposes beautifully (Scheffler, 1974). 
Individual identities, Mead proposed, were entirely shaped by interpersonal 
interactions and the signs—and sign systems, such as language—that made commu-
nication possible. Hegel’s notion that social institutions represented an ideal mind 
could be replaced then by the pragmatic notion that mind itself emerges from the 
material negotiations that comprise social interaction. Dewey found Mead’s work 
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so compelling that he eventually ceded the psychological field to his friend: He felt 
he would be able to gather all he needed from Mead’s social psychology.7 
Hegel’s texts are vast, complex, and arguably indeterminate in even their 
central meanings (Bencivenga, 2000; Desmond, 1992; Olson, 1992). Yet Dewey 
and Vygotsky held to several related themes within Hegel, Dewey through the 
lens of Mead, Vygotsky of Marx. Below, I consider the three Hegelian influences 
on Vygotsky that Kozulin identified relative first to Dewey and then to Vygotsky 
(Kozulin, 1990, p. 18): 
The historical nature of the human being;•	
The role of work and the notion of “psychological tools”;•	
The Hegelian dialectic of Becoming. •	
The historical nature of the human being
Dewey sought to position all of his philosophical premises and pedagogical claims 
within the historic sweep of human culture and, more immediately, within the 
narrative of Western civilization. At the most basic level of consideration, human 
history provided the grounds from which Dewey wrested the central tenets of his 
philosophy of knowledge. 
Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security. He 
has sought to attain it in two ways. One of them began with an attempt 
to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his destiny. . 
. . The other course is to invent arts and by their means turn the powers 
of nature to account; man constructs a fortress out of the very conditions 
and forces which threaten him. He builds shelters, weaves garments, makes 
flame his friend instead of his enemy, and grows into the complicated arts 
of associated living. (1929/1960, p. 3)
Dewey also identified a specific range of intellectual possibilities that had 
been constructed by Western civilization and were therefore tied to the material 
conditions and cultural dynamics of the moment (1916/1944; 1920/1957). Dewey’s 
reasoning at both the more basic and this more proximate level helped to shape his 
diagnoses of and prescriptions for modern democratic societies and schools.
Just as theories of knowing that developed prior to the existence of scien-
tific inquiry provide no pattern or model for a theory of knowing based 
upon the present actual conduct of inquiry, so the earlier systems reflect 
both pre-scientific views of the natural world and also the pre-technolog-
ical state of industry and the pre-democratic state of politics of the period 
when their doctrines took form. (1920/1957, p. ix)
Vygotsky (1986) focused his historical lens on the evolving capacities of lan-
guage and on the complex relationship between human thought and the sign systems 
that both enable and express that thought. Drawing upon the work of Köhler and 
other zoologically minded psychologists of the time, Vygotsky pursued the relation-
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ship between thought and speech into both the earliest days of human civilization 
and into the first conscious phases of an individual’s psychological development.
Verbal thought is not an innate, natural form of behavior, but is determined 
by a historical-cultural process and has specific properties and laws that 
cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech. Once we ac-
knowledge the historical character of verbal thought, we must consider it 
subject to all the premises of historical materialism, which are valid for any 
historical phenomenon in human society. (1986, pp. 94-95)
For both theorists, historic human conditions not only served to determine 
broad cultural possibilities: they also informed the work of schools in a direct man-
ner. The dilemmas of one’s historical moment were a function of the tension be-
tween what one’s culture had adequately articulated and what now lay in wait just 
beyond the assurances of such understandings. Only children’s active appropriation 
of those shared understandings could provide the generative framework necessary 
for their minds to envision relevant new interpretations and possibilities.
One must also remember that, in broad terms, Vygotsky and Dewey did 
share in a particular historical moment within Western thought. Although Dewey 
did not read Vygotsky’s work (which had not yet been translated into English), 
he traveled to the Soviet Union in the 1920s, where schools were exploring the 
implications of Pragmatism in the nation’s early years. Dewey’s early works were 
among those being translated and published within Vygotsky’s milieu at this 
time (Cole, 1996). As Popkewitz has pointed out, although the narrative terms 
and images of their two cultures overlapped in some ways and differed in oth-
ers, Dewey’s and Vygotsky’s practical visions for schools more or less aligned 
(1998, pp. 535-570). 
The role of work and the notion of psychological tools
Dewey, Vygotsky, and their intellectual heirs in the field of education have all con-
cerned themselves with the processes through which children come to appropriate 
the conceptual and material means of their cultures.8 Arguments in The School and 
Society, particularly the chapter on “The Psychology of Occupations,” establish the 
primacy of work as a civilizing force in Dewey’s mind.
It does not follow that all instincts are of equal value, or that we do not in-
herit many instincts which need transformation, rather than satisfaction, 
in order to be useful in life. But the instincts which find their conscious 
outlet and expression in occupation are bound to be of an exceedingly 
fundamental and permanent type. . . 
However, these interests as [occupations] develop in the child not only 
recapitulate past important activities of the race, but reproduce those of 
the child’s present environment. . . . He comes in contact with facts that 
have no meaning, except in reference to them. Take these things out of 
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the present social life and see how little would remain—and this not only 
on the material side, but as regards intellectual, aesthetic, and moral ac-
tivities, for these are largely and necessarily bound up with occupations. 
(1900 & 1902/1990, pp. 136-137)
Dewey spoke of the individual’s “appropriation” of cultural tools and pur-
poses, language closely associated with the Vygotskian tradition (Wertsch, 1998, p. 
138). Though rooted in Dewey’s lifelong preoccupation with democratic political 
forms, Dewey’s insistence that all citizens must lay claim to the means and pur-
poses of cultural production clearly aligns with Marxist concerns regarding the 
dignity of work and the human need to identify with the results of one’s labor. As 
Dewey put it:
A society is a number of people held together because they are working 
along common lines, in a common spirit, and with reference to common 
aims. The common needs and aims demand a growing interchange of 
thought and growing unity of sympathetic feeling. The radical reason 
that the present school cannot organize itself as a natural social unit is 
because just this element of common and productive activity is absent. 
(1900 & 1902/1990, p. 14)
Dewey’s principal argument here is that the social dynamism needed to nurture 
a vibrant society’s aims and means must be kindled within schools. Lest I risk the 
impression, so frequently gathered from cursory readings of Dewey, that Dewey 
cared more about spirit than tools, however, I cite at some length below from The 
Child and the Curriculum, Dewey’s most explicit rebuttal to such misreadings. For 
Dewey, common spirit could only live as a function of common understandings 
and methods.
On the face of it, the various studies, arithmetic, geography, language, 
botany, etc., are themselves experience—they are that of the race. They 
embody the cumulative outcome of the efforts, the strivings, and the suc-
cesses of the human race generation after generation. They present this, 
not as a mere accumulation, not as a miscellaneous heap of separate bits 
of experience, but in some organized and systematized way—that is, as 
reflectively formulated.
Hence, the facts and truths that enter into the child’s present experience, 
and those contained in the subject-matter of studies are the initial and 
final terms of one reality. To oppose one to the other is to oppose the in-
fancy and maturity of the same growing life: it is to set the moving ten-
dency and the final result of the same process over against each other; it 
is to hold that the nature and the destiny of the child war with each other. 
(1900 & 1902/1990, p. 190)
Dewey is speaking here—in general terms—about what Vygotsky termed 
“scientific” and “spontaneous” concepts. The “facts and truths . . . contained in the 
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subject-matter of studies,” which Dewey claims represent the child’s “destiny,” are, 
in Vygotsky’s language, “scientific concepts.” 9 The “truths that enter into the child’s 
present experience” result from a child’s spontaneous thought, the course of which 
Piaget strove to document. Below, Vygotsky speaks of the organizing influences of 
what Dewey calls “reflectively formulated” knowledge above.
School instruction induces the generalizing kind of perception and thus 
plays a decisive role in making the child conscious of his own mental pro-
cesses. Scientific concepts, with their hierarchical system of interrelation, 
seem to be the medium within which awareness and mastery first develop, 
to be transferred later to other concepts and other areas of thought. Re-
flective consciousness comes to the child through the portals of scientific 
concepts. (1986, p. 171)
Vygotsky’s background in linguistics and in literary analysis set the stage 
for a lifelong preoccupation with the role words might play, not only in the psy-
chological development of the young, but also in the liberation of humanity. From 
Marx’s general concern with the material means of labor—leading in Marx’s case 
to an analysis of industrial economic relations—Vygotsky identified language as 
the defining human tool, the one that supported the intersubjectivity that made 
abstract reflection itself possible (Wertsch, 1985). Consequently, and though the 
influences of Marx and Hegel on Vygotsky are often cited in one breath, Vygotsky 
can most often be seen moving through Marx to Hegel—and to Hegel’s concern 
with concepts—in his major works (1978; 1986).
For example, Vygotsky ends his final work, Thought and Language, with 
discussion of several excerpts from plays and poetry and with this mention of 
Hegel:
The relation between thought and word is a living process; thought is born 
through words. A word devoid of thought is a dead thing:
. . . and like bees in the deserted hive
The dead words have a rotten smell.
N. Gumilev
But thought that fails to realize itself in words also remains a “Stygian 
shadow” [O. Mandelstam]. Hegel considered word as a Being animated 
by thought. This Being is absolutely essential for our thinking. (1986, p. 
255)
Vygotsky’s inspired project was to study the development of this Being and the 
play of its possibilities in the world. Ironically, between Dewey and Vygotsky, the 
Marxist psychologist arguably proves the more poetic of the two. For although both 
Vygotsky’s focus on semiotics and shared meanings and Dewey’s focus on experi-
ence and shared purposes were rooted in the realities of human activity, Dewey’s 
focus can be seen to represent the more elemental and, indeed, the more material 
set of concerns.10 
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The Hegelian dialectic of Becoming
Kozulin also finds Hegelian influence in Vygotsky’s commitment to studying learn-
ing and development as processes rather than as a series of discrete performances 
or static states.11 In considering this claim, one needs to recall that both Dewey and 
Piaget shared this commitment and that process-oriented models and methods 
have multiple sources in psychology and in the Western intellectual tradition more 
generally.12 Particularly after Darwin, traditional philosophical questions regarding 
human means and purposes came to be cast in terms of biological and evolution-
ary processes (Persons, 1950; Richards, 1987). 
Certainly, though, Hegel’s scholarship continued to play a formative role 
within these deliberations (Kojève, 1969). Given the care with which both Vy-
gotsky and Dewey read Hegel, Hegel’s central notion of Becoming would have 
likely informed their sensibilities in this regard. 13 Here is a sample of Hegel’s lan-
guage on Becoming:
The readiest example is Becoming. Every one has a mental idea of Be-
coming, and will even allow that it is one idea: he will further allow that, 
when it is analysed, it involves the attribute of Being, and also what is the 
very reverse of Being, viz. Nothing: and that these two attributes lie un-
divided in the one idea: so that Becoming is the unity of Being and Noth-
ing. (1873/1975, p. 130)
Although Dewey wrote less on learning science and its methods than did the 
two psychologists, he called for methods that could study learning as it unfolded 
(Dewey, 1928/1988; Mayer, 2007). Dewey understood that the static psychometric 
measures that loom so large within schools today could characterize little of what 
he sought when he spoke of the rewards of educational experience. He believed that 
meaningful educational experience, like all experience, is situated and relational; 
novel juxtapositions generate new qualities of coherence that shift and elevate one’s 
relationship with the world. Below, Dewey speaks of art as experience, but what he 
says applies in his mind to all true experiences, if not to all experience. 
Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, 
and dead centers when we have an experience. There are pauses, places of 
rest, but they punctuate and define the quality of movement. They sum 
up what has been undergone and prevent its dissipation and idle evapora-
tion. Continued acceleration is breathless and prevents parts from gaining 
distinction. In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and 
fuse into unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as 
they do so— (1934/2005, p. 38)
With such language, Dewey strives to evoke a process that subsumes concep-
tual oppositions—including any absolute distinction between “inner” and “outer” 
reality—within a greater multidimensional whole. Garrison, in contrasting Dewey’s 
conceptualization of learning with that of Leont’ev (who advanced the Vygotskian 
research tradition after his mentor’s death) argues that Dewey’s theory of “trans-
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action” actually goes further than Leont’ev’s in transcending the binary between 
knower and known (2001, pp. 275-296). Garrison quotes Vygotsky’s work, Mind 
in Society,14 in order to locate the origins of what he identifies as a continuing Vy-
gotskian tendency to speak of two separate realities that must be mediated, rather 
than one continuous reality that might be analyzed in various ways in addressing 
differing purposes.15 Whether or not such differences of linguistic emphasis result 
primarily from the analytic demands of psychological research (Miettinen, 2001, 
pp. 297-308), Garrison’s discussion serves to elucidate Dewey’s apprehension of 
human experience as seamless and dynamic.
Both Dewey (1988) and Vygotsky (1986) also voiced reservations regarding 
the extent to which psychology could truly be considered a naturalistic science 
given science’s traditional emphases on immutable laws and static formulas. For 
both scholars, the study of learning and development entailed methods that could 
move with a child’s emerging meanings and that could sensitively mediate between 
those meanings and an adult’s understandings. 
While Dewey, as an educator, could call for the study of learning as it un-
folded within the context of progressive schools, Vygotsky faced the challenge of 
inspiring learning within an experimental setting.
Our method may be called experimental-developmental in the sense that 
it artificially provokes or creates a process of psychological development. 
This approach is equally appropriate to the basic aim of dynamic analy-
sis. If we replace object analysis by process analysis, then the basic task of 
research obviously becomes a reconstruction of each stage in the develop-
ment of the process: the process must be turned back to its initial stages. 
(Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 61-62)
For both Dewey and Vygotsky, learning and development were interwo-
ven with each other and the social and material worlds in complicated ways. This 
complexity did not suggest, however, that methodical studies of learning and de-
velopment were not possible or necessary, quite to the contrary. The considerable 
challenges did imply, however, that imaginative methods would be required. Here 
Vygotsky sums up his introductory section on method in Mind in Society:
To study something historically means to study it in the process of change: 
that is the dialectical method’s basic demand. To encompass in research 
the process of a given thing’s development in all its phases and changes – 
from birth to death – fundamentally means to discover its nature, its es-
sence, for “it is only in movement that a body shows what it is.” Thus the 
historical study of behavior is not an auxiliary aspect of theoretical study, 
but rather forms its very base. (1978, pp. 64-65)
Dewey as mediator between Vygotsky and Piaget 
The disciplinary differences between Dewey’s role as a philosopher and Vygotsky’s 
and Piaget’s roles as psychologists naturally position Dewey as a potential synthe-
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sizer of the others’ scholarship. Although Vygotsky was more the sweeping theorist 
and less the exacting experimentalist than Piaget, he nonetheless placed his work in 
conversation with that of Piaget and other developmental researchers, framing the 
empirical studies that would speak to that world. The time-consuming research that 
supports scientific theorizing naturally narrows the scope of scientific debate; espe-
cially fertile lines of investigation, such as Piaget’s, can consume entire careers.
In reflecting on the integrative possibilities of Dewey’s vision, it is useful to 
revisit the organizing purposes of each scholar’s project. Again, Piaget sought 
to explore the ways in which children, in reckoning with material realities, come 
to construct logical and mathematical reasoning over time.16 The observation of 
his close colleague, Bärbel Inhelder, that Piaget was “a zoologist by training, an 
epistemologist by vocation and a logician by method” well conveys not only the 
principal dynamics of Piaget’s work but also their disciplinary origins.17 
Of the three theorists, only Piaget drew on Neo-Platonic notions of a tran-
scendent rationality: his oeuvre places great store in the transformative potential 
of a socially mediated, biologically grounded propensity to discover logical and 
mathematical forms. In Piaget’s view, Western culture was now capable of moving 
beyond centuries of unconsidered adherence to inherited myths and assump-
tions and in relation, instead, to a transparent rationality capable of imagining 
and enacting the greatest good for the greatest number. Although Dewey and 
Vygotsky shared related hopes, neither of them placed formal logic and math-
ematical reasoning in so pivotal a role.
In responding to Piaget’s project, Vygotsky objected to Piaget’s exclusion 
of the cultural dimension of a child’s learning and development, questioning 
how one could fully appreciate what a child might understand of the world in 
the absence of a sustained pedagogical interaction. Vygotsky argued that all hu-
man thought and speech necessarily implicate language and other cultural tools; 
a nuanced attention to how children make use of such cultural forms must be 
involved, then, in any comprehensive attempt to apprehend the nature of their 
reasoning (1986, pp. 12-57).
As a Russian scholar who lived to witness Soviet dominion over any num-
ber of traditional rural societies, Vygotsky looked to modern Western education 
to develop more sophisticated forms of thought among these new citizenries. 
At the same time, Vygotsky certainly expected that Western thought would 
continue to evolve as a function of ongoing scientific advancements, such as his 
own and those of his colleagues. Interestingly, it was Vygotsky and Piaget who 
shared untroubled assumptions regarding the natural links between what they 
saw as the predictable forward momentum of Western science and the broader 
forward momentum, therefore, of Western understanding.
Dewey, in contrast, interrogated the relationship between science, art, 
and morality in modern times, identifying aesthetic and philosophical insight as 
the ultimate expression of a society’s worth.18 Whereas for Vygotsky, “scientific” 
thought more or less represented the integrated forward movement of modern 
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rationality, for Dewey, a culture’s inherited assumptions and values needed to 
be continually examined and reborn in relation to a culture’s ever more sensitive 
scientific understandings.19 If Piaget under-theorized the role cultural resources 
play in formulating human thought, then, Vygotsky can be charged with under-
theorizing the inherent tension between established cultural means and the new 
and divergent thinking that drives any intellectually open society. 
As intellectual inheritors of the Enlightenment rift between free scientific 
exploration and the dictates of Rome, both Dewey and Piaget were culturally in-
clined to recognize scientific demonstration and logical reasoning as essential to the 
struggle against intellectual and political tyrannies of any order. The work of both 
scholars can usefully be seen, therefore, as moving in opposition to an unreflective 
appropriation of inherited understandings; at the same time, one must note that 
Dewey and Piaget took decidedly different tacks in this regard. 
Piaget stressed the sensitive nurture of children’s developing logical capac-
ity because he believed that by respecting the integrity of children’s distinctive 
thinking one would maximize one’s chances of acculturating children to the cul-
tural tradition that mattered most—an interest in and ability to reason logically 
(see Chapman, 1986).  Dewey, on the other hand, had identified lived experience—
with its embedded historical, developmental, and cultural contingencies—as the 
organizing framework for all human understanding. Although he insisted that 
inherited assumptions must be reexamined in relation to contemporary under-
standings, Dewey (1934/2005) did not believe that all that mattered could be 
articulated in propositional, let alone formal logical, terms.
In two central aspects, then, Dewey’s scholarship can be seen to integrate the 
orientations of Vygotsky and Piaget. In insisting on the necessary role of science in 
the ultimate fashioning of a democratic culture’s aesthetic and philosophical vi-
sion, Dewey can be seen as placing a Piagetian focus on logical and mathematical 
reasoning into an active relationship with Vygotsky’s emphasis on the necessary 
(and inescapable) contributions of inherited cultural understandings and meth-
ods.20 In framing lived human experience as the basis for all consideration of hu-
man meaning, Dewey engages both the exigencies of individual sensibility and the 
demands of social context. 
Again, Dewey found that the people of a democratic nation, in addition to 
sharing a set of political arrangements, must share a broad array of methods and 
aims; they must appreciate the rewards and demands of collaborative efforts of 
many kinds. For Dewey, a particular quality of intellectual involvement with one’s 
world represented both the necessary means and exalted purpose of democracy 
as a social and political form. It is no accident, then, that Dewey’s work provides 
a synthesizing lens for the work of Vygotsky and Piaget, two psychologists whose 
research suggests new approaches to fostering children’s cultural literacy and ana-
lytic clarity, respectively.
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Implications for Contemporary Education Practice
As I have argued, Dewey’s insight regarding the organizing social influences of 
shared means and purposes generated a vision of education that was always at 
least as much about students’ appropriation of cultural methods and understand-
ings as it was about the development of students’ critical sensibility. Dewey (1900 
& 1902/1990) never imagined that one might replace the other, as much as the bal-
ance between them may well shift within various disciplinary and developmental 
contexts. Students’ powers of independent observation, analysis, and theorizing 
were to be honed within the crucibles of key cultural production and democratic 
knowledge construction processes. 
Current progressive educational practice can generally be seen to embrace 
this very balance, although the role of cultural forms can remain under-theorized, 
particularly within work that emerges most directly from the Piagetian tradition.21 
Under-theorized or not, however, essential cultural tools remain reliably in place; 
Piagetian experiments, and their accompanying paraphernalia, continue to fill 
investigatory math and science curricula. Piaget’s method of engaging children’s 
thinking has now also been adapted to other disciplines. As work inspired by learn-
ing theorist Eleanor Duckworth’s (1996; 2001) adaptation of Piagetian method to 
pedagogical purposes has demonstrated, attention to students’ meaning-making 
can uncover not only developmental, but also cultural and individual differences 
in conceptual framing.
Contemporary interest in Vygotsky’s work, set against the more estab-
lished influences of Piagetian theory, has encouraged educators to consider the 
tension between an individual and his or her cultural context that Dewey’s no-
tion of lived experience subsumes. Sociocultural research and theory has sup-
ported educators in articulating the fundamental disciplinary assumptions and 
methods that democratic citizens must appreciate if they are to take part in the 
social, intellectual, and political negotiations of the day. In addition, sociocultural 
scholarship has begun to theorize the pedagogical processes whereby students 
come to appropriate such assumptions and methods (see, e.g., Lemke, 1990; 
Kozulin, 1998). All of this work offers a necessary corrective to the field’s current 
preoccupation with thin performance measures and suggests ways of moving 
beyond the disciplinary uncertainty that has made so extreme an over-reliance 
on psychometric test scores possible.
Naturally, Dewey’s practical curricular interpretations of his work could be 
spare in places (or, at this point, dated); a scholar interested in outlines that broad 
will delve only so far into specifics over even a long career (though surely Dewey 
went further in this direction than most philosophers). 22 Howard Gardner, in a 
useful discussion of the ways in which later developments in learning science 
have informed progressive educational commitments, reminds us that anach-
ronistic criticisms of early progressive theorizing are unfair (1991, pp. 195-199). I 
have further argued that the historically insensitive analyses that generate such 
anachronisms risk derailing needed theoretical syntheses.
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Conclusion
As we have seen, both Dewey and Vygotsky looked to schools to acculturate the 
young of their societies into a system of methods and meanings that the children 
might adapt to their future needs and purposes. Both scholars spoke of their soci-
eties as driven by newly emergent material forces and saw the fostering of a critical 
and informed intelligence within their citizenries as the best assurance that un-
foreseen challenges might be adequately met by future generations. Both believed 
that such an education was essential to the development of more just and more 
enlightened societies. 
Although Dewey and Vygotsky both stressed the role of established cul-
tural forms in elevating the condition of their societies, both men also empha-
sized that children must be taught to claim such means through an active social 
engagement that provides connections between these forms and the child’s 
worldview. Here, Piaget joins their ranks. Vygotsky and Dewey may have shared 
more organizing commitments, but Piaget basically agreed with them regarding 
the implications of developmental learning theory for school practice.23
Dewey, Vygotsky, and Piaget all saw reason and culture as informing each 
other in necessary ways and as advancing together. Piaget’s research into develop-
mental constraints helped to frame Vygotsky’s subsequent attention to semiotic me-
diation. Against the dynamic relationship generated by these two sets of contrasting 
research priorities, Dewey constructed a synthesizing philosophical frame. 
Educational theorists detract from this emerging coherence when they em-
phasize the differences between any two of these theorists to the near exclusion of 
their shared concerns.  Given that Dewey, Vygotsky, and Piaget all sought to tran-
scend the parochialisms of the differing psychological orientations of their day, it 
seems particularly inappropriate to contrast any two of these scholars based pri-
marily upon their immediate historical circumstances. Although there seems to be 
no evidence that Dewey, Vygotsky, and Piaget were in direct conversation with each 
other, they were all in conversation with a particular period of human history and 
with longstanding philosophical and psychological issues rooted in the Western 
philosophical and psychological traditions that they shared. 
Together, then, the scholarship of these three major theorists underwrites 
the twentieth century turn toward the study of the ways and means of human 
intelligence as a basis for pedagogical forms and towards the honing and accul-
turation of a critical human sensibility as the defining goal of a free and fair edu-
cational system. All three have advanced the work of engaging children’s creative 
capacities as a means of initiating them into the complex work of collaboratively 
making sense of the world. In particular, John Dewey, philosopher of democracy, 
framed a new form of pedagogical relationship that continues to demand greater 
elaboration and emphasis within his nation’s ostensibly free and fair schools. 
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Notes
1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at AERA 2007.
2. Piaget, 1923/1959. This first psychological text of Piaget’s explicitly explores social 
influences on children’s thought, an interest to which Piaget returned periodically, particu-
larly toward the end of his career.  
3. See Cork, 1950; Farrell, 1950. Both Cork’s essay on Dewey and Marx, and Farrell’s 
reflection on his journey with Dewey to Mexico for Trotsky’s trial offer nuanced reflections 
on Dewey’s relationships with Marx and with Marxism. See also Ryan, 1995.
4. Dewey, 1939/2003; Shook, 2000. Absolutism not only came to Dewey by way of He-
gel, but more personally by way of the Christian intellectual heritage he and Hegel shared. 
See prologue in Westbrook, 1991, for a brief treatment of Dewey’s religious influences as a 
child.  Also, Ryan’s 1995 analysis is again pertinent here.
5. In contrast, Marx, though Jewish by ancestry, was raised as a nominal Lutheran by 
his father, who had converted for political reasons from what appears to have been a simi-
larly nominal Judaism. One can imagine that Marx’s appreciation of German idealism owed 
something to this upbringing.  As had Hegel, Marx lived under a socially and politically op-
pressive Prussian monarchy and would wait in vain for the Prussian state to implode in ac-
cordance with his theory. Singer, 2000.
6. See Ryan, 1995 for a treatment of Mead’s post-Hegelian influence on Dewey, also 
Daniels et al, 2007.  Cole also traces his efforts to reconcile Soviet cultural-historical psychol-
ogy with cultural anthropology through Mead by way of Geertz. See Cole, 1996, p. 123. 
7. Ryan, 1995. The parallels with Vygotsky’s work are striking, raising questions as to 
the influences of Wundt’s work on Vygotsky.
8. Dewey, 1916/1944, 1938/1963; Kliebard, 1987; Kozulin et al, 2003; Vygotsky, 1978; 
Wertsch et al, 1995.
9. That Vygotsky meant to reference more than the mathematical and scientific un-
derstandings Piaget studied with his term “scientific” was evidenced by Vygotsky’s investi-
gative accomplishments and ambitions—to study the comprehension of narrative line, for 
example, or the development of concepts such as “exploitation.” Vygotsky, 1986, p.162; see 
also Daniels, 2001. Vygotsky’s use of the term “scientific” likely derives from Hegel’s and 
Marx’s use of the term to reference systematic conceptual analysis (see Singer, 2000).
10. This is not to suggest that Dewey neglected the organizing role of language. Jim 
Garrison (2001) quotes Dewey as speaking of mind as “an added property assumed by a 
feeling creature, when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creature which 
is language, communication” (pp. 292-293). 
11 In speaking of Hegel’s dialectic of Becoming, Kozulin does not necessarily reference 
either dialectical materialism or the Hegelian idealism that helped spur Marxian utopia-
nism. Rather, Kozulin seems to be suggesting that Vygotsky sought to study the movement 
that results from the play of conceptual oppositions that distinguishes Hegelian dialectical 
process. In a similar manner, Dewey’s attention to transcending dualisms can be traced to a 
concern with dialectic process, though Dewey renounced transcendent ideals as a dialectical 
process’s ultimate outcome. 
12. Chapman, 1988. Though instrumentalist interpretations of Piaget’s work emphasize 
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the distinctions between the developmental stages Piaget theorized, Piaget actually saw the 
evolution of logical reasoning processes as a continuous process. 
13. For example, Kozulin may also be evoking Vygotsky’s interest in the dialectical pro-
cess as the source of self-consciousness, a concern that can be traced to Hegel (Kojève, 1969) 
and which Dewey shared.
14. Vygotsky’s well known formulation was, “An operation that initially represents an 
external activity is reconstructed and begins to occur internally,” Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 55-57.
15. As Garrison (2001) puts it, “Transactional thinking allows us to see things as belong-
ing together functionally, such as lungs and oxygen producing flora that are usually never 
connected.  Transactionalism allows us to recognize them as subfunctions of a larger func-
tion” (p. 286).  In other words, the subject and object categories are themselves infinitely 
malleable and can be constructed in whatever manner might address particular aims.
16. Piaget’s hope was that this work would inform the question of how human reason 
had evolved.  
17 Cited in Smith, 1998, pp. 201-219. In reflecting upon this triumvirate of disciplin-
ary influences, contemporary educators are likely to mark the absence of a cultural lens.
18. Dewey saw science as the “handmaiden” of art. See Mayer, 2007, pp. 176-186. 
19. On Dewey’s vision of the necessary role of science in a democracy, again see Mayer, 
2007.
20. Certainly, Piaget’s attachment to logico-mathematical thought must be seen as more 
extreme, and in that sense less balanced, than Vygotsky’s broader concern with what he did 
term, after all, “scientific” language. As we have seen, for Vygotsky, “scientific” language re-
ferred to concepts that had been abstracted through established processes of cultural articu-
lation.
21. Kamii, 1994. Kamii, for example, published a series on the practical application of 
Piaget’s work within mathematics classroom that arguably under-theorizes the role estab-
lished cultural tools play in this approach.
22. This breadth of vision passed out of fashion within Dewey’s lifetime.  See Westbrook, 
1991, pp. 537-552.
23. Although Piaget generally hesitated to speculate on the implications of his work for 
school practice, he is said to have offered Dewey’s work as exemplary.
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